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ABSTRACT
This paper examines how a�delusive social imaginary of criminal-justice has
underpinned contemporary U.S. mass incarceration and encouraged wide-
spread indifference to its violence. I trace the complicity of th�is criminal-justice
imaginary with�state-organized violence by comparing it to an imaginary that
supported colonial violence. I conclude by discussing how those of us outside
of prison can begin to resist the entrenched images and institutions of mass
incarceration by engaging the work and imagining the perspective of incar-
cerated people.
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We Americans have perfected the art of being both sanctimonious and
deliberately indifferent to the plight of others.
Joseph Dole, ‘Abolish long-term solitary confinement’
For many Americans, state-organised violence is a problem for other
countries but not our own. America is imagined to be ruled by law, which
is viewed as a counterforce to violence and brutality. And yet, as part of its
criminal-legal system, the United States currently incarcerates a greater
percentage of its citizens than any other nation. The 2 million individuals
held in prisons and jails across the country have little protection against
rampant physical, sexual, and psychological abuse in facilities that operate
with little public oversight.�Nearly 200,000 men and women are sentenced to
spend their�entire lives behind bars, many for�convictions as juveniles or
young adults. Over 80,000 individuals are confined to solitary units, where
they spend 23 to 24 hours a day alone in cells no larger than 8 by 10 feet,
sometimes for years or even decades, in conditions that the United Nations
considers torture (ACLU, 2011, Everest, 2013, Mayeux 201�5�, Rovner, 2016,
Ghandnoosh, 2017, Solitary Watch�, n.d., The Sentencing Project, n.d.�).
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This paper brings critical attention to the violence of mass incarceration by
examining how it has been masked and facilitated by a�delusive social imagin-
ary of criminal justice. I sketch this imaginary’s contours by comparing it to an
imaginary underpinning colonialism. This investigation accords with recent
work by critical race theorists, who have traced continuities between mass
incarceration and systems of racialised violence, forced labor, and legal inequal-
ity that constituted U.S. slavery (Alexander 2011, Dilts, 2014, Peláez, 2016).
However, while much of the literature views mass incarceration in the context
of slavery, I draw on recent scholars of colonialism, including Dussel (1995),
Quijano (2000), and Rodriguez (2014, 2015)), to trace recurring�colonialist
patterns of state-violence-disguised-as-righteousness. Colonialism is not the
only form of institutionalised violence that reverberates in mass incarceration;
however, recent studies of colonialism offer particularly illuminating insight into
the cultural processes that allow ‘civilised’ people�to accept and even exalt
barbaric violence.
�In tracing analogies between a colonial imaginary of righteous violence
and a contemporary criminal-justice imaginary, I elucidate several mechan-
isms that disguise and support the violence of mass incarceration.
I conclude by examining how the�faculty of imagination can help destabilise
these mechanisms and contribute to honest and responsible engagement
with�the U.S. criminal-legal system. I argue that, while empirical documenta-
tion of the violence of mass incarceration is crucial, we can resist the hold of
an imaginary that abets high-minded indifference only when those of us
outside prison walls begin to imagine the perspective of those held within.1
Colonialism and the disguising of violence
Critics describe colonialism primarily as a vast system of violence. In his
classic study of European colonialism, Frantz Fanon argued that ‘the con-
quest of a national territory and the oppression of a people’ that constitute
colonialism could be achieved only with multi-pronged and systemic vio-
lence (1967, p. 81). ‘The colonialist structure,’ Fanon stressed, ‘rests on the
necessity of torturing, raping, and committing massacres’ as well as impos-
ing European values and customs through ‘cannons and sabers,’ to maintain
the ‘through and through’ subjugation of the colonised people (1967, pp.
34, 40, 72). Aimé Césaire confirms that colonial rule was maintained only by
extreme brutality, including mutilation, massacres of whole cities, forcible
transport of millions of men to labour camps, burning of homes, land-theft,
and cultural destruction (1972, pp. 18–22).�
Colonialism in the Americas was equally violent. The Spanish conquista-
dores pillaged 185,000 kilograms of gold and 16,000,000 kilograms of silver
while killing millions of indigenous Americans through military aggression,
land-theft, famine, rape, forced labour, and deprivation-exacerbated
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diseases (Dussel, 1995, pp. 38–45, Todorov, 1984, pp. 132–42). Colonisers
sabotaged indigenous knowledge-production (Quijano, 2000, p. 541,
Rodriguez, 2014). They also inflicted sexual violence on indigenous
women, u�sing women’s bodies to disempower indigenous men and destroy
the social fabric (Dussel, 1995, pp. 45–47, Smith, 2005, pp. 15–33).
A colonial imaginary of righteous violence
�As scholars of colonialism show, colonial institutions could be maintained
only through an ensemble of�coercive military, socio-political, and cultural
mechanisms. I focus here on one component of this machinery: a social
imaginary that allowed Europeans to interpret colonialism as a noble endea-
vour. European politicians and intellectuals alike presented colonialism in
various kinds of edifying rhetoric; it was presented as salvation for savages,
a civilizing mission, a gifting of material progress, and a productive use of
idle land (Césaire 1972, pp. 13–22, Dussel, 1995, pp. 64–71). Walter Mignolo
describes the basic ruse by which colonial brutality was refashioned in noble
clothes as the logic of coloniality. This logic appears, Mignolo says, whenever
‘control, domination, and exploitation’ are cloaked ‘in the language of
salvation, progress, modernization, and being good for everyone’ (2005,
p. 6). If this logic made sense to ordinary Europeans, however, it is because
the logic was animated by what I call an imaginary of righteous violence:
a set of culturally transmitted myths of social identities and the social world
that allowed Europeans to make sense of the outrageous claim that coloni-
alism was ‘for the good of all’ (Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda cited Dussel, 1995,
p. 63). Below, I describe how key elements of the colonial imaginary sus-
tained this deception.
‘The Indian’ as violable subject
‘Indian,’ of course, was the name that Columbus gave to�the inhabitants of
the western Atlantic islands, which he thought was India. From the begin-
ning, the European image of ‘the Indian’ was developed – not through close
attention to, or communicative interaction with, indigenous people – but
through colonisers imposing their perspective and interests on the people
whose land they occupied. As ruling-class Europeans sought to present
themselves as authoritative knowers, rightful settlers, and world rulers,
‘Indians’ were invented as people who had no culture, no diligence, no
laws, no morals, and no reason; in effect, creatures whom Europeans could
dominate and exploit while attributing their aggression to�the subjugated
people's ‘vices’.
Colonial-era scholars betray the European interests behind the construc-
tion of ‘the Indian.’ For instance, while Spain was invading the Americas, the
Spanish philosopher Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda argued in his famous
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Valladolid debate with Bartolomé de Las Casas that ‘the Indian’ was naturally
servile and Spaniards naturally suited to rule (Todorov, 1984, p. 153). As
Western European nations began to appropriate American land, the lazy and
unruly ‘Indian’ served as a foil for the supposedly disciplined and productive
(male, upper-class) European. For instance, in the mid-17th century, Thomas
Hobbes (1968, p. 187) contrasted his proposed law-based government to
the ‘brutish’ conditions of ‘the savage people’ in the Americas. Half a century
later, John Locke (1980, pp. 21, 24) contrasted ‘the industrious and rational’
landholders of England to both ‘the quarrelsome and contentious’ people
living on the English commons and ‘the needy and wretched’ people of the
Americas, both of whom were supposedly unfit for land ownership. In the
19th century, Georg Wilhelm Hegel contrasted the strong-spirited people of
‘the West’ to ‘the Indians’ of South America, who were supposedly so
slothful that ‘at midnight a bell had to remind them even of their matrimo-
nial duties’ (1956, p. 82).
‘Progress’ as ‘good for all’
�If ‘the Indian’ represented an innately defective subject whose vices justified
the violence inflicted on him, then invocations of higher ideals allowed�the
violence to be lauded as noble. Early colonisers claimed to bring ‘civilisation’
to ‘savages.’ Later colonisers increasingly appealed to socio-economic ideals
of ‘progress’ and ‘modernisation.’ In all its permutations, the idealised form
of life was conceived from a European perspective but presented as uni-
versal. ‘Progress,’ for instance, was cast in European liberal-capitalist terms
but regarded as the supreme aim of all human communities (Césaire 1972,
pp. 11–17, Dussel, 1995, pp. 64–67).
Eurocentric images of ’progress’ compounded a myth of human advance-
ment that found expression in thinkers from Hobbes to Hegel. In this myth,
‘progress’ was construed as ‘a trajectory that departed from a state of nature
and culminated in Europe’ (Quijano, 2000, p. 542). Even when the 19th
century brought greater attention to history, the same basic myth of the
West as the apex of humanity became further elaborated. For instance,
Hegel (1956, p. 99) claimed that Africans were so incapable of development
that their enslavement by Europeans constituted ‘a phase of education’ by ‘a
higher morality and the culture connected with it.’ Ultimately, images of
‘progress’ and ‘the Indian’ did not so much deny colonial violence as�cast it
as ‘pedagogic violence,’ for which colonisers considered themselves ‘not
only innocent, but meritorious for inflicting’ (Dussel, 1995, p. 66).
The colonial imaginary and the institutionalising of violence
The colonial imaginary not only dressed colonial violence in edifying clothes
but provided visions for organising colonial institutions. In particular, images
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of ‘the backward Indian’ and ‘the modern Westerner’ gave force to the
modern logic of ‘race,’ around which colonial society was organised. ‘Race’
logic both organised colonial hierarchies and disguised them as a function
of ‘natural (racial) differences and not consequences of a history of power’
(Quijano, 2000, p. 541). In effect, as ‘race’ differences were codified in law
and materialised in divisions of labour, colonial hierarchies gained a veneer
of normalcy. The racially organised society ‘confirmed’ that indigenous
people were unfit for the polity and ‘naturally obliged to work for the profit’
of Europeans (Quijano, 2000, p. 539).
The imaginary of righteous violence also demanded violent tactics to
maintain its own credibility. Since the Conquest, indigenous people have
resisted European cultural hegemony and continued to live by their own
values and narratives (Rodriguez, 2014). Thus, European colonizers could
maintain the presumed universality of their cultural frameworks only by
force. The early conquistadores tore down temples, set fire to eight centu-
ries of Mayan codices, and burned alive indigenous spiritual leaders (Dussel,
1995, pp. 42–54, Quijano, 2000, pp. 540–542, Rodriguez, 2014, pp. 28–37). In
the 19th and 20th centuries, the U.S. and Canadian governments outlawed
Native American spiritual practices and forced Native American children into
boarding schools, where their languages and rituals were forbidden (Smith,
2005, pp. 35–53). More recently, in continued efforts to suppress challenges
to colonialist interpretations of the world, the Arizona state legislature has
outlawed popular Raza Studies programs in Tucson, fired teachers, and
banned books (Rodriguez, 2015).
The colonial imaginary and the thwarted imagination
Finally, colonialist myths discouraged Europeans from imagining colonialism
from the standpoint of indigenous Americans. The philosopher Hannah
Arendt explained the role that the faculty of imagination plays in our
understanding of political phenomena. Following Kant, Arendt explained
that the imagination is ‘an important tool of cognition’ by which we repre-
sent to ourselves in our mind a phenomenon that is not directly present
(Arendt, 1953a, p. 79). Arendt’s insight is that the imagination is especially
vital to political thinking. This is because political phenomena cannot be
reduced to preconceived categories or logics but can be adequately under-
stood only when approached as humanly initiated and humanly endured
phenomena that appear under ‘innumerable perspectives and aspects’
(Arendt, 1958, p. 57). With the imagination, Arendt explained, we can
approach a political phenomenon in its uniqueness and existential richness,
even while exceeding our immediate experience of that phenomenon; for
we can imaginatively ‘visit’ the standpoint of others and thereby engage the
phenomenon in its human depth but from new angles (1953b, pp. 391–392,
1982, p. 43). In effect: If a social imaginary guides us in making sense of the
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world in terms of received cultural logics, then the imagination (as a faculty)
keeps us responsive to aspects of the living world that exceed familiar
�llogics.
Feminist critics have raised questions about the adequacy of the imagi-
nation for engaging radical otherness. For instance, how can we ensure that
our imaginative ‘visiting’ of another’s standpoint is true to the other’s very
different way of seeing the world? How do we ensure that we do not bring
so much baggage on our ‘visit’ that our own biases burden our imagination
of the other’s perspective? In light of such concerns, feminist scholars have
emphasized the need for interaction and solidarity with concrete others, or
close engagement with others’ stories, which can be challenging and dis-
comfiting (Ortega, 2006, Stone-Mediatore, 2003, pp. 74–78, Taylor, 1993).
Still, these concerns do not so much devalue the imagination as they
underscore the need to pursue imaginative ‘visiting’ with humility, diligence,
and attentiveness to concrete others.
In the context of colonialism, the myth of ‘the Indian’ thwarted precisely the
kind of work necessary for Europeans to imagine indigenous perspectives with
any adequacy. Granted, many Europeans had political, economic, and psycho-
logical interests that deterred them from considering indigenous perspectives.
Still, the myth of ‘the Indian’ abetted such self-interestedmyopia by suggesting
that the indigenous people had no perspective of their own for Europeans to
consider. As Dussel put it (1995, p. 33), ‘the Indian’ was an ‘aesthetic and
contemplative fantasy’ of Europeans that ‘covered over’ actual indigenous
people with an image of Europe’s projection. Moreover, the myth of ‘the
backward Indian’ boosted European attitudes of superiority and authority,
thereby derailing precisely the kind of humility and listening skills that would
have been necessary for meaningful ‘visiting’ of indigenous standpoints. In
effect, themyth facilitated a situation inwhich colonisers did not try to learn the
indigenous people’s language, listen to them, or understand their cultures but
viewed the indigenous people as mere objects to analyse or bodies to exploit.
‘[I]n the best of cases,’ says Todorov, referring to the Spaniards’ fascination with
the Aztecs, the colonisers ‘speak well of the Indians, but with very few excep-
tions they do not speak to the Indians’ (1984, p. 132).
Mass incarceration as disguised violence
Critics have increasingly recognised mass incarceration as state-organised
violence. Many have documented severe and systemic physical and psycholo-
gical abuses against people who are incarcerated. Some also describe how
aggressive incarceration of marginalised populations decimates families and
communities. Others analyse how a multi-million-dollar prison industry bene-
fits prison-related industries and gentrification, while bleeding schools and
social services (Hamilton, 2015, 2017, Irwin, 2005, Kilgore, 2017, Peláez, 2016).
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�Despite the critical analysis, however, U.S. prisons continue to be viewed
by many as a mainstay of the U.S. justice system. Multiple factors conceal
the brutality of mass incarceration from those of us who remain sheltered
from it. A two-tiered system of justice for people of different social classes,
the geographic isolation of prisons, prison practices that obstruct commu-
nication across prison walls, a mainstream media that tends to cover prison
violence only in terms of threats to ‘staff security,’ and a culture of disdain
for people who are less fortunate all contribute to keeping many Americans
oblivious to the systemic violence of our criminal-legal system (Davis, 2009,
Dole, 2014, Van Cleve 2016, p. xii).
Supporting all these processes of concealment and attitudes of aloofness,
I argue, is an imaginary of criminal justice that functions similarly to the colonial
imaginary of righteous violence. The ruses of our own institutions are more
difficult to discern than those of the past; however, by tracing structural and
functional analogies between the colonial imaginary and today’s criminal-
justice imaginary, I excavate some of the mechanisms that have underpinned
widespread indifference to the violence of mass incarceration.
Early expressions of the imaginary of criminal justice
The images that animate today’s imaginary of criminal justice can be traced
to classic theories of the modern state. These theories articulate the modern
concern with security as well as the identification of security with punish-
ment of lawbreakers. Viewed in historical context, they betray how common
notions of ‘security’ and ‘the criminal,’ not unlike colonialist myths of ‘pro-
gress’ and ‘the Indian,’ have been complicit with state-organised violence.
�While Spanish, French, Dutch, and English colonisers were invading the
Americas, Hobbes and Locke wrote their classic treatises of consent-based
government. Notwithstanding their differences, both philosophers describe
security as a central purpose of the modern state and both identify security
with punishment of lawbreakers. For instance, Hobbes (1968, p. 205) argues
that anyone who defies the laws of the state threatens the system of law
and ‘cannot be received into any Society.’ Hobbes (196�8, pp. 92, 93) also
identifies ‘witches’ as ‘justly punished’ for threatening the social order. Locke
(1980, p. 12) holds the government to higher standards but he, too, stresses
that the government (and, in some cases for Locke, citizens) can punish
lawbreakers to safeguard the public and restore justice. As examples of
appropriate punishment, Locke explains that someone who has been the
victim of a crime that is punishable by death can enslave the alleged
criminal, for the accused can always take his own life, if he prefers (1980,
p. 17). Locke also allows for a victim of robbery, or even intended robbery, to
defend himself by killing the offender, if law enforcement is not immediately
on the scene (1980, p. 15).
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In the abstract, the identification of security with punishing lawbreakers
has a compelling logic. The images that animated this logic in 17th century
England, however, took shape against a background of contested social
processes, such that calls for ‘security’ against ‘thieves’ lent themselves to
being used by the wealthy in their efforts to eliminate people who stood in
their way. For instance, as modern capitalism developed, English elite
sought to privately enclose community land to pursue more lucrative shee-
pherding and private industries. This led to the dismantling of feudal and
village agriculture, dismissal of farm labourers and retainers, disbanding of
feudal armies, and displacement of the people who inhabited common
lands (Allen, 1992, Marx, 1967, p. 448). Meanwhile, English law made bur-
glary and minor shoplifting punishable by death. In this context, many of
the ‘thieves’ punishable by execution were people pursuing acts of survival
upon being left homeless and unemployed by land enclosures. In addition,
‘witchcraft’ laws – which led to the torture and execution of over 100,000
people across Western Europe – specifically targeted village women, thereby
fragmenting the communities who lived on the common lands and disrupt-
ing their resistance to enclosure (Starhawk, 1982). In fact, many of Locke’s
contemporaries were aware (as a 17th-century folk poem put it) that the law
locks up the poor but ‘leaves the lords and ladies fine/Who take things that
are yours and mine’ (Anon�, n.d.).
The contemporary ‘tough-on-crime’ imaginary
In today’s world, ‘criminal’ may seem a fit label for someone who has broken
a law; and punishment of criminals may seem a rational means to security. The
ruses of colonialism and of Locke’s England, however, caution us to consider
how today’s ‘security’ and ‘criminal’ may operate as part of a deceptive social
imaginary: an imaginary that obfuscates state violence by inventing depraved
subjects against whom violence is cast as ‘good for everyone.’ I argue below
that today’s criminal-justice images are, in fact, such cultural inventions.
Myths of ‘security’
The ‘security’ that drives today’s mass incarceration has a specific history. It
has roots in early modern identifications of ‘security’ with punishment of
lawbreakers. It also stems from more recent U.S. ‘tough-on-crime’ rhetoric,
which calls for the punishment to be particularly severe. Some scholars trace
this tough-on-crime rhetoric to the social unrest of the 1960s and 1970s,
when conservatives found it useful to blame the turmoil on ‘bad people’
(Alexander 2011, pp. 40–43, Irwin, 2005, pp. 229–31). Academics contributed
to this outlook by theorising ‘[w]icked people’ who posed a threat to
‘innocent people’ (James Wilson cited Irwin, 2005, p. 229). In this account,
although crime rates did rise in the 1960s, the emerging ‘tough on crime’
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rhetoric was a political invention. It called for ‘security’ against ‘wicked
people’ to promote an agenda of aggressive incarceration that would
detract attention from social problems and bring disgruntled social groups
under state control.
�The call for ‘tough-on-crime security’ has materialised in specific legal
practices. Under the banner of ‘tough-on-crime,’ states have implemented
stiff criminal codes, laws that facilitate police search and seizure, hardline (or
non-existent) parole boards, and laws that strip legal rights from people
who are incarcerated (Alexander 2011, pp. 61–72, Oleson, 2002, Irwin, 2005,
von Wilpert, 2011,�Gopnik 2012, Mayeux, 2015, Ghandnoosh, 2017). These
practices exhibit ‘toughness,’ but their security-value rings hollow for many
Americans. In fact, studies do not show that aggressive incarceration prac-
tices have increased security (Ghandnoosh, 2017, Human Rights Watch.,
2007, Wildeman, 2012). Neither do these practices respond to real security-
needs, for they often have corresponded to declining crime rates (Alexander
2011, Peláez, 2016).
Moreover, tough-on-crime practices have made many Americans insecure.
For people in low-income neighbourhoods, ‘tough-on-crime’ has meant
greater vulnerability to apprehension by police and abuses after apprehen-
sion. For instance, laws that make it easier for police to arrest for ‘gang
activity’ and ‘loitering’ have led people to be jailed for activities as benign as
standing outside with friends or waiting for a bus (Casey & Watkins, 2014,
p. 142, Van Cleve 2016, p. 170). Aggressive pursuit of criminals also has
backlogged criminal courts, so that people without bail money can be kept
in dangerous jails for extended periods, sometimes years, while they await
trial (Gonnerman, 2014). In addition, the increased number of people being
prosecuted, with the number of public defenders remaining constant, has
meant that indigent people are receiving increasingly inadequate legal
counsel. At the same time, recent laws restrict a person’s ability to challenge
a wrongful conviction, even in the case of clear attorney negligence (von
Wilpert, 2011). Additionally, laws that criminalise immigration have exposed
many people to racial profiling, detainment, and abuse by instruments of
the law simply for ‘being brown’ (Casey & Watkins, 2014, pp. 140–144,
Rodriguez, 2015, Van Cleve 2016, p. 82).
Within prisons, calls for ‘tough-on-crime security’ have bred cultures of
punishment that expose incarcerated individuals to all kinds of violence.
Unrestrained beating, macing, and rape of incarcerated individuals�by
guards as well as other egregious forms of abuse, including fatal suffocation
and submersion in scalding water, have all passed unprosecuted (Oleson,
2002, pp. 854–58, Gonnerman, 2015, Dole, 2016b�, Grasha, 2017, Hawkins,
2017,�Mills, 2017, Protect 2017). The same cultures of punishment have
sanctioned regular ‘disciplinary’ practices so severe that they constitute
torture. For instance, for ‘infractions’ as minor as ‘insolence’ or refusing
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sexual advances by guards, guards can send people to solitary units where
they spend 23–24 hours per day in a cell of ‘gray walls, a solid steel door, no
window, no clock, and a light that [is] kept on twenty-four hours a day’
(Solitary Watch�, n.d, citing resident testimony). For years, or even decades,
their only physical contact with another human being ‘is the incidental
brushing up against the guards who must first place them in handcuffs
and chains’ before removing them from cells (Solitary Watch,�n.d., citing
Craig Haney). Another state-sanctioned abuse is the regular use in some
states of tactical teams that storm through prisons with clubs and pepper
spray, whoop and bang their clubs on bars as they yell at inmates to ‘get
asshole naked,’ keep inmates contained for hours without water or bath-
rooms while they ransack cells, and commit other unconscionable abuses,
such as forcing inmates to march ‘nuts-to-butts,’ bent over and in close
proximity, only partially clothed. Prison officials defend the raids as ‘neces-
sary [security] measures’ (Dolinar, 2017).
�Myths of ‘the criminal’
�Like 'security,' America’s ‘criminal’ is also a cultural invention. The narrative that
identifies ‘security’ with harsh punishment also transforms the target of punish-
ment from a person who has broken a law to ‘an undifferentiated mass of
uncontrollable criminality’ (Mayeux, 2015). Multiple cultural practices shore up
this fantastical image of ‘the criminal’ as the embodiment of malignance.
�The media, for instance, actively constructs people who are in police
custody as despicable beings. A regular feature of television news is the
‘perp walk,’ in which a person who has been arrested is paraded before
media cameras, often in handcuffs and prison attire, thus appearing as an
objectified and debased ‘criminal’ – even before the person has been tried
(Dole, 2014, pp. 8–14). The media also distributes mugshots of arrested
persons, in which ‘the unflattering bright light, the drab background, the
name and prisoner ID at the bottom – tells us we are looking at a "criminal�,”’
an objectified bad guy (Davis 2015). The extent to which America’s ‘criminal’
is a cultural invention is betrayed by the recent trend of Halloween haunted
houses that advertise themselves as ‘haunted prisons’ and offer costumed
‘monster-criminals’ for Halloween entertainment (Bellware, 2016).
The cultural manufacturing of America’s ‘criminal’ is revealed, also, by its
class and race dimensions. As is now well known, African Americans do not use
or sell drugs anymore than whites; however, African Americans are targeted by
police and incarcerated for drugs at much greater rates (Alexander 2011, p. 99).
Moreover, as in Locke’s time, when the poor were hung for taking a goose off
the pasture but lords got away with appropriating entire pastures, ‘criminal’
applies uniquely to the underclass. As Alexander (2016) puts it, we tolerate the
Wall Street executives who destroyed the savings of millions of American
families in 2008 and the politicians who ‘take millions of dollars from private
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prisons, prison guard unions, pharmaceutical companies, oil companies,
tobacco companies, the NRA and Wall Street banks . . . killing us softly . . . But
selling CDs or loose cigarettes? In America, that’s treated as a serious crime,
especially if you’re black.’
Tellingly, when those who fit society’s image of ‘the criminal’ are con-
victed of crimes, they regularly face decades-long prison-sentences and
permanent demonisation (Alexander 2011, pp. 14–177, Davis, 2009, Dole,
2014, pp. 213–22). Yet if upper-class persons are apprehended, their crimes
tend to be distinguished as ‘white-collar crimes,’ for which they receive
limited sentences in federal prisons, upon completion of which they are
dubbed ‘former white-collar criminals.’ Some have been invited to speak
about business ethics at major universities, where they find understanding
and empathy. Walter Pavlo (who served 2 years for a 6 million-dollar fraud
scheme) was invited to Temple University because they wanted students ‘to
understand how easy it can be to make a mistake that results in prison time’
(Farrell & O’Donnell, 2005). According to the teacher who invited Pavlo, ‘The
last thing we wanted was finger-wagging, or someone saying, "You better
be good people” . . . Most people are good, and then they enter an arena
with incredibly high pressure’ (Terry Halbert cited Farrell & O’Donnell, 2005).
Such empathetic reception has earned Havlo hundreds of thousands of
dollars in speaking fees while it has spared affluent people from having to
imagine someone like themselves as a ‘bad guy.’ The attitude that ‘most
people are good’ and environment pressures them to do bad things is not
afforded, however, to the many under-privileged people whose brushes
with the law have reduced them to ‘outcast[s], undeserving of a second
chance . . . pariah[s] for life’ (Dole, 2014, p. 213).
The ‘tough-on-crime’ imaginary and the institutionalization of state
violence
If today’s ‘monster-criminal’ and ‘tough-on-crime-security’ are cultural inven-
tions analogous to colonialist myths, then the comparison to colonialism
challenges us to consider how these myths have been instrumental in
fostering state violence. First, the comparison challenges us to examine
how our criminal-justice myths, like colonial myths, contribute to an ensem-
ble of institutional practices that regularise the abuse of people defined as
violable subjects. For instance, the myth of ‘tough-on-crime-security’ has
focused legal institutions on punishment and encouraged those institutions
to treat people convicted of crimes as mere objects of punishment. In this
context, prison employees tend to be trained only in methods of restraint
and empowered to punish with little oversight. If long-term solitary con-
finement and vicious tactical units have become routine, and if physical
assaults on incarcerated individuals regularly go unprosecuted, then this is
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because myths of security through punishment of objectified ‘criminals’
have organised all facets of the criminal-legal system. Tellingly, when the
state of California was charged with severe overcrowding and human-rights
violations in state prisons, even the state’s attorney acknowledged ‘very
significant violations of constitutional rights’ but argued that the main
cause of the violations was not overcrowding but ‘the culture of disregard
for the inmate’ (cited in Mayeux 201�5).
The comparison to colonialism also highlights how myths of ‘the criminal’
(not unlike myths of ‘the Indian’) encourage state officials to treat people who
are so labelled as if they were inferior beings, which effectively turns those
people into social inferiors. For instance, a study of Chicago’s Cook County
court system (Van Cleve 2016) describes how judges and lawyers tend to
‘criminalise’ underprivileged defendants – regardless of their actual relation
to the crime in question. The disdain that court professionals held toward
people in their custody was clear from the terms they used for them, which
included ‘"scum,” "pieces of shit,” "bad guys” – even "banana suits” (which refers
to the jail jumper that defendants in custody must wear in court)’ (Van Cleve
2016, p. 57). The most common term for the defendants was ‘mopes,’ an
epithet signifying lack of work-ethic, which translated in court culture to
inherent culpability. ‘Professionals find it difficult to regard a defendant as
anything but amope,’ reports Van Cleve. ‘By the professionals’ logic, if someone
was motivated, hardworking and competent, he or she would not be charged
with a crime’ (2016, p. 58). Armed with these biases, the courts reduce many of
the people in their custody to the stereotypes they hold of them: riffraff to be
swiftly processed or abominations to be prosecuted to the fullest extent
possible (Van Cleve 2016, pp. 69–73).
When we compare the ‘tough-on-crime’ imaginary to the colonial ima-
ginary, we likewise challenge ourselves to consider how many of us (like
colonial Europeans) have become alienated from the human beings tar-
geted by our myths. The comparison challenges us to consider how we may
have detached from�incarcerated people in ways that have impaired our
own responsiveness to barbarism. For instance, Stateville Correctional
Center in Illinois regularly warehouses men for 22–23 hours a day in barren,
often sweltering, unventilated, walk-in-closet-sized cells, without even
a desk or chair. Meals often consist of spoiled and cockroach-tainted food,
are eaten in rooms infected with bird droppings, and are announced over
loudspeakers twice a day as a directive to ‘line up for feed-time.’ And yet,
when state inspectors visit, they speak only to the guards about their
capacity to control the imprisoned men. They do not speak with the men
who are incarcerated or ask them about their treatment as human beings.
Similarly, when politicians or students tour prisons, they hear only from
prison officials. ‘It’s like they’re visiting a zoo; the prisoners are only there
for display’ (J. Dole, personal communication, 2 March 2017).
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The criminal-justice imaginary and the silencing of incarcerated voices
The comparison to colonialism also prompts us to consider how, as in the
crushing of indigenous voices under colonialism, our criminal-justice myths
facilitate the forceful silencing of incarcerated people. For instance, under the
guise of ‘security,’ many prisons deny journalists access to prisons and some
states explicitly prohibit any interviewing of inmates (Gonnerman, 2015). Some
states also prohibit incarcerated people from having social-media sites (mana-
ged by friends on the outside) where they can post their work (Kelkar, 2017).
In the context of multiple prison rules that obstruct communication
across prison walls, incarcerated individuals can express their critical per-
spectives on prisons only via hunger strikes, work strikes, or buildings
taking-overs. Even when incarcerated individuals risk severe punishment
by taking such actions, the media tends either to ignore them or reduce
their efforts to ‘security threats.’ For instance, a recent strike against prison
labour by thousands of incarcerated individuals across the country received
little news coverage (Kim, 2016). At Kinross prison in Michigan, before men
went on strike, they attempted to peacefully express their concerns about
abusive conditions. The prison responded by punishing those who relayed
the grievances. Subsequent peaceful stands of unity by inmates were met
with indiscriminate tear-gassing and physical abuse (Thompson, 2017).
Another recent strike at Vaughn Correctional Center (known for its severe
overcrowding and excessive punitive measures) received media attention
when hostages were taken. A rare perspective from inside prison walls
reached the public when an anonymous inmate used a stolen phone to
explain the strikers’ demands: ‘education first and foremost,’ rehabilitation
programs, and accountability for the prison budget; they also were reacting
against ‘Donald Trump. Everything that he did’ (Thompson, 2017, citing
anonymous striker). Such perspectives were lost to television news, how-
ever, which focused solely on tactics used to crush the strike, the death of
a guard, and statements by prison officials promising to punish those
responsible. In typical manner, the prison responded with indiscriminate
brutality against all men in the facility (Cherry, 2017, Thompson, 2017).
Such drastic responses to prison strikes betray another level of brutality
associated with ‘tough-on-crime’ myths: incarcerated people who share
their critical perspectives on incarceration are reduced to ‘security threats’
and severely punished. As I write, my friend Lacino Hamilton, in response to
having shared his views on incarceration in a radio interview, sits in an
isolated cell and faces charges that can keep him in lockdown/isolation for
years (L. Hamilton, personal communication, 20 September 2017). In
response to his political writings, Keven Rashid Johnson was gassed while
handcuffed and then left in the gassed cell; he was assaulted with gas again
after reporting the incident (Protect Kevin ‘Rashid’ Johnson from prison
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repression, 2017, Thompson, 2017). Other incarcerated individuals who have
worked for prison reform have been physically assaulted and sent to isola-
tion for years or even decades (Blau & Grinberg, 2016). Human-rights groups
report that ‘solitary confinement is widely employed against prisoners who
are perceived as representing any kind of threat to the absolute power of
prison authorities. This is true even if inmates are seeking to organize for
positive change and even if they are completely nonviolent’ (Ridgeway &
Casella, 2011, citing Solitary Watch). Incarcerated individuals have little
opportunity to challenge such charges, because the charges ‘are levied,
adjudicated, and enforced by prison officials with little or no outside over-
sight’ (Solitary Watch�, n.d.).
In circular fashion, the repression of incarcerated people’s voices has
helped maintain the myth that incarcerated people have nothing worth-
while to say.�It has allowed systemic inattention to incarcerated individuals
to pass unnoticed..
�The silencing of incarcerated voices likewise has prevented many of us
from seeing the human beings beneath the ‘criminal’ label. It has prevented
us from seeing that the targets of aggressive incarceration have been largely
people with mental illnesses, young adults whose only family have been
gangs and in whom the state has had no interest until charging them with
crimes, people of low socio-economic status who have been targeted by
police and who lack adequate legal representation, and even people like the
displaced of Locke’s era who have been apprehended by the state in order
to make way for economic ventures of the wealthy (Alexander 2011, pp.
97–139; Castro�,201�5, Dole, 2014, pp. 19–93, Hamilton, 2015, 2017, Van Cleve
2016, von Wilpert, 2011). The repression of incarcerated voices also has
denied recognition to the many individuals who have educated themselves
while in prison, worked hard to improve their lives, and�are "looking to get
back some self-worth by somehow giving back" (Dole, 2004) 2017b�, 2015
Conclusions: the need for resistant imagination
Finally, a comparison of today’s criminal-justice imaginary to the colonial
imaginary directs us to consider how the criminal-justice imaginary has
thwarted the imaginative work necessary for those of us outside of prison
to understand mass incarceration. Arendt has explained how imaginative
‘visiting’ of other people’s standpoints is essential to understand political
phenomena. Feminist standpoint theorists have underscored the need to
‘visit,’ in particular, the standpoint from marginalised lives, for such stand-
points offer unique insight into social contradictions that ruling beliefs
obscure (Stone-Mediatore, 2003, pp. 162, 179–184). In the case of contem-
porary mass incarceration, however, incarcerated people have been so
thoroughly demonised that the missing perspective is hardly noticed. In
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addition, the brutal silencing of incarcerated people who attempt to express
their political views has reinforced the myth that incarcerated people have
no views beyond those projected onto them. ‘Tough-on-crime’ myths even
encourage self-satisfaction in our indifference to the targets of our ‘tough-
ness.’ ‘Criminals,’ says Alexander (2011, p. 141), ‘are the one social group in
America we have permission to hate.’
If edifying myths and brutal reinforcement of those myths have treated
incarcerated people as voiceless and violable subjects, then the comparison
to colonialism also challenges us to�reexamine our most deeply ingrained
notions of ‘violable subject.’ It challenges us to consider the perspective of
the people we have presumed to have no perspective. For those of us
outside of prison, imagining the perspective of people locked within prisons
is no simple task. As feminist critics warn, imagining the perspective of
people in situations radically different than our own demands arduous
practical work as well as openness to the unsettling of familiar narratives.
In this case, it means destabilising the divisions between ‘good’ and ‘bad’
people, and between law and violence, around which many of us have
oriented our lives. It also demands endeavours such as close engagement
with the work of incarcerated writers and artists, reaching out through
letters to incarcerated individuals, or joining practical struggles with incar-
cerated people or their families.
Fortunately, various journals, websites, and prison-justice organisations
facilitate such endeavors by sharing the work of incarcerated writers, artists
and activists. The stories shared through these forums help make palpable
the monstrosities of U.S. prisons as well as the resilient humanity of the
individuals confined within them. For instance, in his story of the animals he
encounters while serving a life-sentence, Joseph Dole highlights the irony of
being labelled an ‘animal’ by a society that ‘misunderstands both incarcer-
ated people and animals’ (2017c�, p. 143). His story invites us into a world
where ‘yard time’ means being locked into a solitary concrete box; ‘violent
criminals’ nurture a baby turtle; ‘jailbirds’ connect with ‘the free world’ by
exchanging chirps with real birds; and ‘one of society’s alleged bogeymen’
risks punishment to help a baby bird return to its mother (Dole, 2017c�, pp.
132–138). When Dole recounts the guards threatening him as he gently
coaches a frail bird to safety; and when he describes ‘clanking along in
shackles, a waist chain, and handcuffs encased in a black, steel padlocked
box,’ while to his amazement ‘a large rabbit jumped out of the hedges along
the path, and passed right between [his] legs, brushing the shackles’ (2017c�,
p. 140), the images confound familiar narratives of ‘human’ and ‘animal,’
‘good guy’ and ‘criminal.’ They guide us in imagining the unimaginable: the
caging of human beings. When Dole proposes that his fellow Americans
‘stop painting us all with a broad stigmatizing brush’ and ‘start acting more
like the animals in here,’ who judge the incarcerated men as individuals, he
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provokes a new look not only at incarcerated people but at ourselves as
jailers, who keep ‘hundreds of thousands of people incarcerated for life, long
past the time they cease posing any threat to society’ (2017c�, p. 143).
Although fraught with challenges, the task of engaging the voices and imagin-
ing the perspective of people who are incarcerated is vital to undermining the
mechanisms of institutionalised violence. We can respond ‘to people who say
"prison shouldn’t be a picnic,”’ says Hamilton (2015), only when we ‘shift
conceptions of the humanity of the incarcerated’ and begin to face incarcer-
ated people as human beings. Documentation of the myriad abuses of human
dignity and bodily integrity that are systemic to U.S. prisons is also crucial;
however, if the abuses are not to be refashioned into ruses of ‘just punishment’
and ‘necessary security measures,’ then we need to begin viewing these
phenomena from the standpoint of people who are incarcerated.
I cannot anticipate all the ways that the standpoint of the incarcerated would
illuminate the U.S. criminal-legal system. Based on my analysis, however,
I anticipate that such endeavours would raise troubling questions. For instance:
How can we distinguish between law and violence when routine legal practices
violate human integrity? How does the systematic disregard for the voices and
humanity of incarcerated individuals degrade our own humanity? And how can
we heal our communities and secure all members of our society from violence�?�
Careful engagement with incarcerated voices and imagination�of their perspec-
tive does not provide easy answers. Nor does it directly confront the extreme
power imbalances that facilitate violence against incarcerated people. Still, by
raising such questions and encouraging us to approach them with a sense of
connection to the lives from which many of us have been alienated, the diligent
‘visiting’ of incarcerated standpoints could help us resist someof themechanisms
of institutionalised violence and reckon more honestly with that violence.
Note
1. In this paper, I use the first-person plural to refer to people who have not been
incarcerated. I hope that my readers will include people on both sides of
prison bars; however, my argument about the need to imagine the standpoint
from incarcerated lives is directed to people who lack first-hand experience of
incarceration.
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